My reasons for this submission must be briefly stated as I have already dealt.
with them at length in a paper I wrote and published just over four years ago.
Certain wetiological facts stand out:-(1) Traumatic neurasthenia usually develops after an interval varying from a few days to a few weeks following an accident, and is just as likely to develop without as with the occurrence of a physical injury. I have seen during the last month at least three cases of the kind, associated with a serious railway accident, in all of which it was admitted that the patient had escaped without a scratch.
(2) Traumatic neurasthenia rarely develops when a really serious physical disability, such as broken limb, has been sustained.
(3) Traumatic neurasthenia does not develop after hunting accidents for which only the rider or his horse is responsible. After such accidents our difficulty lies in making the patient take his concussion or other injury seriously enough. In nine cases out of ten he wants to get back to his hunting before he is in a fit state to do so.
(4) When traumatic neurasthenia follows an accident, the site of injury is immaterial. It is common after blows on the head or spine because injuries to these parts are in the lay mind associated with the idea of particularly terrible forms of disablement. It is met with after injuries to any part of the body.
The psychopathological factors concerned in the development of these psychoneuroses are so numerous and variable that I must content myself with referring only to a few of the most important.
The nature of the accident may be influential if it is such as to evoke an emotional disturbance in the form of fear. Unfortunately this "fright" is not referred to JA-NEUR 1 under its proper name; it is referred to as "shock" or a "shock to the system," terms which carry no discredit to the patient and which suggest indefinitely prolonged consequences. Only recently I saw a woman who had been in a railway accident an(d who carried in her bag an illustrated paper with a photograph of the wrecked train in splinters. She had escaped unhurt, but was very anxious that no one, inclutding myself, should underestimate the horrors through which she had passed. For the first week she was rather exhil;arated by her experience, by the fact that she had been able to help others less fortunate than herself and by the interest taken by all her friends in her adventure. This was followed by an emotional reaction to which some doctor had given the unfortunate natne of "delayed shock." From that moment the question of compensation arose and grew, with the result that the fatniliar picture of traumatic or, in this instance non-traumatic, neurasthenia was soon established.
In workmen's compensation cases the factors contributing to the produiction of traumatic neurasthenia are often trivial individually, but their cumulative effect is overpowering, especially when the patient is approaching the time of life when his value in the labour market is becoming precarious and the possibility of a small but permanent petnsion presents itself to his mind. Perhaps I may be forgiven for quoting from a paper of my own a typical story of this kind:-" Smith has been injured in an accident occurring in the course of his employment. The accident took place in such a way that it caused a considerable emotional disturbance-that of fear. This is often called shock, but is distinct from surgical shock. The injury caused pain, and the doctor on examining him said "By Jove, you have had a narrow squeak: an inch to the left and the blow would have broken your back." A restless niglht follows, during which he remembers that there were only three men doing what ought to have been done by four. This gives rise to the sense of injury. His employers are responsible for his suffering. A mate comes to see him a day or two later and reminds him that Jones had a somewhat similar accident and was dead within a year. (It is immaterial from their point of view that Jones died of influenza and pneumonia.) His wife is a plucky woman and sympathetic, also much incensed against the employers because of the neglect to supply sufficient labour for the job. She makes him comfortable at home, in spite of shortened means. His injury is really slight, and after going to the hospital or his doctor twice a week, for two or three weeks, there is no physical disablement. But the seeds which were planted have grown, and will continue to grow, with the result that a condition of anxiety neurosis is soon in full bloom. If the doctor said be had had a very narrow squeak, it is obvious that he must have been very seriously injured, and he could not be well in a month. Even if he appeared well there was always the possibility that something else would develop. Did it not in the case of Jones ? It must be remembered that to the lay mind trauma is still the most important and universal aetiological factor in medicine, just as it was in medical textbooks fifty years ago. A paini here or a pain there is sufficient to keep him on the alert for complications and sequelae. Fear and anxiety keep him awake at night, and so the vicious circle is formed. Beneath the surface, all the time, is the knowledge that his employer was responsible for making him ill, and is still responsible for getting him well. Yes, he will go into hospital for treatment, but under protest. He will come out of the hospital worse than he went in, and more convinced thereby that the injury he received was far more serious than other people, particularly the insurance officers, realized. Weeks, months, and perhaps a year or two pass by. He has either become incurable or is at last tempted to accept a lump sum of money in full compensation for all his claims. In doing this, he has, unwittingly, resumed responsibility for his health, and sooner or later health is restored to him."
The psycho-pathological factors concerned, therefore, in the production of traumatic neurasthenia may be briefly summarized as:
(a) Fear at the time of the accident. (b) Anxiety in regard to possible consequences to health. (c) The subconscious desire to safeguard the future.
(d) The sense of injury. (e) The knowledge that the responsibility for the accident and for its results lies on somebody else's shoulders. (f) The ignorant interpretation of various symptoms which arise as the neurosis develops. (g) The injudicious remarks and advice supplied by doctors, relatives and of friends, and (h) The worry attendant upon impending and perhaps delayed litigation.
Traumatic neurasthenia, according to this view, may be defined as a mental disorder, indistinguishable clinically from an anxiety neurosis, developing after an accident, with or without injury, the responsibility for which lies on other shoulders than those of the patient.
If this definition be accepted, the first question I should put to our legal friends is Can this disability be regarded as the result of the accident ? " That some doubt on this point has arisen in judicial minds is suggested by the following quotation from a lawyer's letter: " The employers' case is that the man's inability to work is caused by his brooding over the effects of the accident and that he is suffering from weakness of will and a fixed but erroneous idea that he is a chronic invalid. If they establish this proposition, then the court would have power to refuse further compensation. If, on the other hand, this man is suffering from neurasthenia, as we are advised, he is then entitled to a continuance of the compensation."
To my mind, the employers' diagnosis is not materially different from that of " neurasthenia "; in other words, I should regard the alternative diagnoses, on the choice of which legal judgment depends, as meaning one and the same thing.
The problem is an important one from both an economic and an ethical point of view. Insurance offices and large corporations, such as railway companies, are chiefly affected economically, and vast sums of money must be paid by them in compensation for a form of disability which, it might be argued, is not the result of an accident or of a trauma but which, owing to the frailties of the human mind, is apt to appear, under favourable conditions, as a sequel to such accident or trauma. Can this be defended on ethical grounds ? Is it in the interests of or for the good of the community at large that this should be the case ? Does the practice not tend to place a premium on lack of morale ?
The solution of this difficult problem does not lie entirely with the lawyers. There can be little doubt that if doctors generally were as keenly alive to the psychological as they are to the physical dangers of a patient who has been in a railway accident, if they took as much care to prevent infection of his mind witlh insidious and morbid ideas as they do to prevent the infection of his wounds with septic organisms, the seeds of traumatic neurasthenia would rarely be sown. The realization that the soil has been prepared by the accident for the growth of the primitive instincts of fear and acquisition, should stimulate his efforts towards nipping them in the bud. On the other hand, we are to blame for using the term " traumatic neurasthenia" as denoting a disease which is the direct result of an injury, and for the moral, or immoral, effects we produce when we confuse our patients' minds and obscure the issue by talking about shock when we really mean fright. Still more reprehensible is the not uncommon practice of treating a patient with established neurasthenia by giving him a weekly bottle of medicine and the exhortation to take plenty of exercise in the open air. It is his mind and not his body which needs attention and unless his mind is put in order there is little hope of restoring his health. Improvement in the standards of medical treatment, both preventive and remedial, would certainly lessen the incidence of traumatic neurasthenia, but it would not abolish it.
Can the law dealing with these difficult cases be altered with advantage? Supposing the law refused to recognize all disability arising from mental disorders belonging to the category of the neuroses, what would be the result ? If such a step were practicable I have little doubt that the result would be excellent and that traumatic neurasthenia would soon be a very rare form of illness. But the practical difficulty would arise in connexion with diagnosis, and we should still continue to see the time-honoured but painful conflict of medical evidence shifted to another field. This difficulty will never be satisfactorily settled until the question of diagnosis is submitted to medical instead of legal jurisdiction.
Ott the other hand, the law might take an entirely opposite view. It might regard the accident as responsible for all subsequent disorders of the mind, because its occurrence was the foundation stone on which the neurotic superstructure was gradually erected. Just as a slight abrasion of the skin might lead, if neglected, to a serious or even fatal septic8emia, so might a fright be the starting point, if untreated, of a formidable and perhaps incurable anxiety neurosis.
In that case the workman who broods over his accident and harbours erroneous ideas of chronic invalidism should be as justly entitled to prolonged or permanent compensation as the sufferer from traumatic neurasthenia.
In this brief survey of the subject I have indicated only such points as are of medico-legal interest, in the hope that our legal friends may not only understand our problems, but may contribute to their elucidation. I have purposely refrained from confusing the main issue, by including no reference to questions of purely medical interest, such as those of diagnosis or prognosis. We are sufficiently well aware of the difficulties which often confront us in those connexions, of the importance of recognizing states bearing a prima facie resemblance to that of neurasthenia, which are really the result of organic or structural changes in the nervous system, and of the rare but well recognized complications which may develop as the sequel of apparently unimportant injuries.
The Right Hon. H. P. MACMILLAN said that as a layman he had little claim to address the meeting.
It was true that the Government had entrusted to him the task of investigating certain branches of social pathology and if in the discharge of these various duties be had picked up a few lessons, he would have pleasure in passing on the results to to-night's audience.
The problem of the borderland of medicine and law was one of p)eculiar interest, but the particular question which had been raised was not unfamiliar to those who took part in the administration of the law. It was the daily business of the judge to discriminate between those things which were and those things which were not the direct consequence of a wrong or tort. The law applied what was known as the doctrine of "remoteness" when a person claimed damages, whether as a result of a physical accident or a breach of contract. Where a person could show that he had suffered injury through the negligence of another person he was entitled to recover at law damages for the wrong which had been done to him. But claimants, in these circumstances, were somewhat prone to exaggerate the loss which they had sustained or to introduce illegitimate items of claim, and the legal criterion which was invoked for the purpose of discriminating between those consequences which might be regarded as flowing from the wrong, and those which might not, was Section of Neurology 21 whether the conse(luences were or were not too remote from the initial cause.
Not everything which followed a w rong was treated by the law as a result of that wrong so as to entitle the wronged person to recover damages in respect of every sequel.
He gathered that the problem now being considered was as to whether, in the case of a claim based upon an accident, it was legitimate in estimating the damages to have regard to a supervening psychological state which occurred after the accident. The question involved was one of cause and effect and the task of discrimination between a cause and its effects was daily undertaken by the courts not only in cases involving medical questions, but in almost every department of the law.
An accident had occurred through someone's fault, the plaintiff had suffered in consequence of it; possibly he had sustained no direct physical injury, in the popular acceptation of that term, but a pathological state of mind had supervened wvhich would not have arisen but for the accident. This pathological state may have supervened because of the mental habit of the injured person, who, through lack of robustness, or peculiar susceptibility, has brooded upon the occurrence, and so created a " grievance complex " in regard to the matter. Then arises the question vhether that pathological state may be so related, in law, to the occurrence as to entitle the sufferer to compensation in respect of it. That seemed to be the problem Sir Farquhar Buzzard set forth, couched in legal terms. Lawyers, of necessity, had to be a little rough and ready, for in the work of the courts more or less crude criteria had to be applied; they might not commend themselves to scientific people, but the courts must get on with their business. The general principle applied in the courts was that the plaintiff must be able to show that the damages claimed were in respect of the natural and probable consequences of the occurrence. The formula seemed simple, but in practice was often difficult of application. It might be that a person injured in, say, a railway accident, was of a highly nervous disposition, and therefore more prone to shock and more likely to suffer seriously from the after-consequences. In such a case be thought that the railway company must take their passengers as they found them. Just as they could not plead in mitigation of damages that the person injured had an abnormally thin skull, or unusually brittle bones, so they could not plead that the plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to shock. But there was still the problem of deciding whether the psychological sequels of the accident as exhibited in the particular plaintiff were, or were not, the direct consequence of the occurrence. There might have been what in law is known as a novus actus interveniens. The chain of causality might be broken by the intervention of a new cause, if, for example, one could show that the particular condition of the plaintiff was due not to the occurrence, but to the plaintiff himself having done or suffered something subsequently which introduced a new element, for which the railway company or other responsible party could not be held liable. Then the law would say that the consequences which had ensued were not directly and naturally attributable to what the railway company had done, but were attributable to the intervening act, an act for which the railway company was not responsible. Therefore the task must be one of discrimination. On the physical side, if a simple broken leg resulted through the negligence of the plaintiff's doctor in permanent disablement, the responsibility for this disablement could not be imposed on the original wrongdoer.
Similarly, on the mental side, if the plaintiff's state could be attributed, not to the natural consequences of the accident, but to some subsequent factor in his history, this would be an important plea in defence. No doubt the discrimination was a much more subtle matter on the mental side.
But he did not think the mere fact that the person injured happened to be a highly strung person with a tendency to brood, or with a predisposition to magnify grievances, was a new act intervening. Railway companies must take their passengers with all their various disabilities and idiosyncrasies, and they would still be responsible, even if results of abnormal gravity ensued. i i The function of the doctor was, by his evidence, to enable the court to determine whether the symptoms exhibited could be described as the natural and probable consequences of the occurrence. It was at that point that the medical man could make a great contribution to the cause of justice. No one was more familiar than he was with the gibes which had been made at the expense of the expert witness, but he personially had always recognized that honest expert testimony was not only valuable, but indispensable. The medical profession, skilled in one of the great departments of science, was in a position to aid justice in a most conspicuous fashion. Sir Farquhar Buzzard had said that a case might go one way or the other according to the testimony tendered to the judge by the expert giving evidence. That was true, but it was a responsibility of the doctor rather than of the lawyer.
What was " expert testimony ? " Why was it that in certain types of case the law had always recognized the propriety of admitting a class of evidence which it did not admit in the ordinary case? In the ordinary case evidence as to opinion was inadmissible; the judge simply took evidence of fact from witnesses; any inferences were for the court. In everyday affairs the judge or jury was presumed to be competent to draw inferences from particular facts. But in the scientific realm, upon subjects beyond the competency of the layman, facts might be submitted which to judge and jury were meaningless unless illuminated by the expert; and thus the expert aided the solution of the problem by contributing the knowledge derived by him from his special studies and experience.
There were three ways in which courts of justice had enlisted expert assistance. Sometimes an expert became a member of the court as an assessor. For example, in maritime affairs, as in the case of a collision at sea, the judge frequently sat with a nautical assessor, expert in navigation, who could advise him on technical points of seamanship. Another method was to utilize the expert as a referee, to whom the case was referred for his report. And the third method was where the expert was called before the court as a witness. He (the speaker) regarded the evidence given in court by expert witnesses as being of the very highest value. But very much depended on the attitude of the expert witness. At present the real vice of the situation-it was not confined to the medical expert-was that a theory had grown up that the expert witness was, in a sense, an advocate. He was nothing of the sort. He was called in to give the court his unbiased view, based on his scientific knowledge, without either fear or favour. Despite the gibes against them, he had met many expert witnesses who had acted upon that principle. The doctor witness was speaking on his own art, and the court was entitled to rely on his expressing his sincere views.
Relating this to the present topic he would stage such a case as Sir Farquhar Buzzard had conceived. The plaintiff had been in a railway accident. He might or might not have received actual physical injury, but an abnormal state of psychological disability had ensued and an action of damages had been brought. It was for the medical expert called as a witness to explain to the court the pathological condition of the patient, to give not only a diagnosis of his present condition and position, but also a prognosis, stating his chances of recovery and his probable future. There the judge was at the mercy of the evidence which medicine placed at his disposal. If such witness chose to adopt an easy formula, as by labelling the plaintiff's condition as one of neurasthenia, connoting a certain form of disease, the judge had very little option, if the medical man had told him that the onset of this disease was the direct result of the injury. The judge could only proceed on that evidence, and a verdict for the plaintiff would follow. But if there were also medical evidence from the other side that the plaintiff received only a trifling physical injury, or perhaps only a shock or fright, but that, in consequence of his having :allowed himself to be influenced and his mind to be inflamed and upset by friends and injudicious advisers and instigators, he had developed his present neurotic -condition, and that this condition was not a direct and natural consequence of the accident, but was attributable to such intervening acts, in this way building up a -complex of facts, the legal position miglht be altered. The doctor called by the defence might say that the plaintiff ought to and would ordinarily have recovered -in a week, but that other people by their actions had contributed to and fomented his mental disturbance so as to bring about a definite neurosis and a prolongation of his illness. The railway company would say they were not responsible for the plaintiff's friends having done these things. The judge or jury must decide the questioni of the degree and extent of the original wrongdoer's responsibility on the .evidence put before them.
Formerly the view of the law was that unless a physical lesion could be shown, no claim could be sustained; but the law had advanced, it was learning to take -cognizance of finer shades and to recognize mental injury as a cause of action. But it would never be possible to reconcile the medical point of view with the legal point of view. The former was necessarily scientific and exact, whereas the latter was neither. Therefore it was impossible to apply the tests of science to the -administration of justice. And he did not think it would be right or safe to relegate to an expert body of medical men, not subject to cross-examination, the determination of the question whether the state of the plaintiff was or was not the consequence of the accident which had taken place. The law must take the standard -of the jury and proceed on practical though less precise methods. It was better that a case should be decided on what might be called rough justice than that it should be complicated by refinements. Still, the law was constantly making advances in the matter of a nicer discrimination and greater justice.
For the determination of such cases then he would prefer the couirt of law, with -the assistance of expert testimony, presuming the expert evidence was given with that sense of honour which in general animated the professional man who entered the witness-box to aid the cause of justice with his skilled knowledge.
Sir JAMES PURVES-STEWART. Traumatic neurasthenia is one thing, litigation neurosis is another. Traumatic ,neurasthenia is a bona fide medical illness: litigation neurosis folloWing a trauma is -a legal complaint, using the word "complaint" in both senses. In the law courts, -these two different syndromes, with the factor of antecedent injury common to both, tend to overlap and shade into each other, requiring all the acuity of the legal, the -judicial, and, may we add, the medical mind, to disentangle them.
Many a straightforward medical affair becomes contaminated by the toxins, and antitoxins, of the law. In fact, litigation neurosis may be likened to an originally innocuous drink to which exciting ingredients are added at the bar-'-the legal Bar. Such a "cocktail" is expensive, mainly because of its legal ingredients. And of .course, barristers and judges are probably better authorities on subjects of this sort than are sober-minded physicians.
The purely medical aspect of illnesses which become the subject of litigation would be a comparatively simple affair were it not for the factor of financial compen--sation. The Workmen's Compensation Act has had widespread beneficial effects, pro-tecting the injured workman against the careless, selfish, or unscrupulous employer. Yet one cannot help thinking that this piece of legislation, when originally drafted, contemplated, in the main, gross physical accidents arising in the course or out of a man's employment, and that the increasing proportion of traumatic nervous maladies could scarcely have been foreseen, even by the keenest legal brains. But it soon became evident, after the Bill became law, that many of the simplest surgical injuries had now taken on a different course, and that something had happened whereby the average duration of disability after a simple fracture of the leg, lasting perhaps six or eight weeks in the old days, promptly rose to three or four months. This discussion specifically excludes gross surgical injuries. Tt is restricted to the class of functional troubles known to the public under various names such as " railway spine," " traumatic neurasthenia," and so on. These terms are loosely defined, and the looser the better, so far as litigants, and lawyers, are concerned. One of the results of our modern education is that it has broadcast the glad news of these maladies, far and wide, amongst the intelligent population. We have all heard of the sufferer in a railway accident who, when asked whether he had been injured, replied " I don't know until I have consulted my solicitor."
Excluding gross destructive lesions, which are clinically or anatomically demonstrable, and about whose diagnosis and prognosis there is rarely any serious doubt or dispute, nervous symptoms following an accident are recognized by physicians as belonging to two classes:
(1) Nervous symptoms due to actual physical injury, concussion or commotion, to the nervous system, and/or to emotional shock. These are exemplified in sporting accidents of all kinds, in the hunting field, on football and polo grounds, in the boxing ring, etc. In such cases severe physical concussion is common, and real bona fide symptoms may result, constituting the familiar picture of concussion neurosis, including headache, sleeplessness, anergia, etc. All these symptoms, in a normal individual, in the absence of an atmosphere of litigation, quickly clear up, usually within a few days or weeks, under suitable treatment by rest and simplesedative remedies.
(2) Nervous symptoms due to expectation of nfnancial solatium. These symptoms. are usually real to the patient, but they have an entirely different causation, being produced by the novus actus interveniens, viz., suggestion. The patient's family and friends, and his solicitor, play a large part by reinforcing and supplementing the original symptoms, and even in producing symptoms when these were originally absent. All this is the result of baneful suggestions. The original symptoms, which but for the prospect of compensation would have cleared up in a few days or weeks at themost, are elaborated, decorated and intensified, until they constitute a psychosis which may last for months or even years. This manufacture of symptoms, if consciously done by the injured man, is branded by the law as malingering, a charge which is notoriously difficult to prove in court. Much more commonly the production or persistence of symptoms is an unconscious affair.
Human nature being what it is, the injury affords the plaintiff an opportunity of temporary freedom from work, at someone else's expense; the accident evokes sympathy; discussion with his family, his friends, and his solicitor, fosters thee additional emotional factor of resentment. The injured man feels that he has just cause for damages from someone who can afford to pay. He therefore strives tosecure, not merely as much as he honestly deserves, but as much more as he can get. Obsessed by this idea of financial solatium, he gradually builds up the elaborate structure of compensation neurosis, better termed compensation hysteria, with which we are so familiar. This malady persists for months or years, so long as there is any prospect of future pension or compensation.
The obsessions of compensation neurosis in litigants are not really produced by physical trauma or by fright. They result essentially from suggestions from outside people, and from the fact that the success of a plaintiff's claim for damages depends on the existence and persistence of symptoms, most of which, but for the accident, would not have supervened, whilst any original discomforts following the accident would have cleared up spontaneously. Medical treatment of these cases, no matter how careful or efficient, is of no avail. The hysterical plaintiff neither gets well, nor even begins to improve, so long as his case remains unsettled, or so long as any hope of financial settlement is present in the patient's mind. But as soon as a settlement is effected, the medical care, which up to that moment has been indispensable, is at once found to be unnecessary, the medical attendant is discarded, and the patient often vanishes from medical observation.
In a recent series of seventeen cases of compensation hysteria seen by myself, I tried to secure particulars of the further history of patients following settlement of their claims. In no fewer than ten, no medical particulars could be traced after the verdict; the patient simply withdrew himself from medical observation. In the remaining seven cases in which I was successful in securing particulars, six of the patients promptly recovered and went back to work. I will mention three of these as illustrations. One man was a miner who had sustained an injury to his back and was treated in various hospitals for over five years on account of excruciating pains on any attempt to stand or walk. On the medical evidence the court regarded him as a permanent cripple and awarded him, in addition to his regular pay, a final sum of £500. Within a few weeks of this joyous news, he was walking about, as well as ever. Another man, a commercial traveller, after a motor-bus collision, developed progressively increasing hysterical tremors of the limbs, entirely incapacitating him from his work for a year. He was awarded £750 and immediately went back to active business as before. Another man, a public official, incapacitated for nine months after a motor accident, with tremors, insomnia, and total physical and mental anergia, received £1,250 as compensation; he changed his occupation and, within eight months, had organized several new and flourishing private businesses.
Even the loss of the plaintiff's claim sometimes has a beneficial effect, if he realizes that the decision is a final one. Thus my seventh case was .that of a miner who sustained an injury to his back by the falling of a pit-prop, which laid him up originally for a month. On resuming work he found himself incapable of sustained effort. Accordingly for five and a half years he continued to draw disablement pay and was regarded by his own trade union officials as a bona fide case. Following a medical investigation of his symptoms, his pension was withdrawn. At the hearing of the case the medical referee pronounced him completely recovered from the old injury. The patient thereupon calmly resumed his ordinary occupation and has remained continuously at work for the last two years.
This last example is in accordance with the well recognized experience that a pension, as a solatium for traumatic injuries, is less advantageous for both parties than a lump sum. A pensioner tends to maintain and aggravate old symptoms and to superadd new ones. It would be a good thing if legal authorities, when awarding pensions for functional -nervous symptoms, arranged them on an automatically diminished scale, rather than on a fixed minimum, as is generally done. Better still is the method of compounding the damages, if any, into a lump sum, so that the plaintiff realizes that his case is a chose juqde and that he has nothing more to expect from further litigation.
These opinions are submitted to our legal experts with considerable diffidence; I realize that it would be as unwise for us physicians to draw up legal enactments as it would be for the most eminent legal luminaries to prescribe medical treatment for patients who were critically ill.
Sharpe: Traumatic Neurasthenia and Litigation Neurosis
Dr. SALISBURY SHARPE.
Traumatic neuroses as I see them are of several kinds:
(1) Functional paralysis.
(2) Functional or hysterical contracture affecting a limb, the injury to which may have been of the slightest. The contracture sometimes shows a tendency to indefinite spread.
(3) Liability to true hysterical or hystero-epileptic convulsive seizures.
(4) Definite persistence of a symptom long after complete repair has taken place.
(5) Alleged spread of symptoms, especially pains and pareesthesih to the opposite side or to other regions besides that of the injury.
(6) Psychoses. The lawyers talk about "shock" in every case of injury, however trivial, thus showing that they do not appreciate what medical men mean by the word. They speak of shock as a continuing cause of disability many months after the most trivial injury incurred in circumstances causing no mental stress whatever.
It was a commonplace during the late war that the graver inijuiries were rarely followed by neurasthenia or neurosis of any kind. This was due to the fact that true surgical shock obtunds nervous sensibility and much diminishes suffering, both meutal and physical.
Most of the neuroses following injury are in fact effects of fear.
The worst case of so-called "shell-shock" I have seen is that of a man who has been for nearly ten years wholly incapacitate(d by a purely functionial paralysis. He was enlisted and was for about six months "in khaki," most of thie time in Cornwall, and was at no time nearer the fighting line than Plymouth.
In another case, a patient incapacitated for life had been fireman on an engine which nearly, but not actually, came into collision with another. Here there was no injury, but there was severe fright.
Similarly the most troublesome cases of neurosis in railway work are those of patients having trivial injury-or perhaps none at all-who have been badly scared.
With regard to signs and symptoms, there is one which I believe to be certainly an index, and sometimes perhaps a cause of the persistence of neurasthenia. I refer to the frequent presence of a trace of sugar in the urine.
Fear and emotion are definitely recorded as occasional causes of true diabetes, so there is nothing surprising in such slight and temporary glh cosuria. It is to be noted t.hat a modified form of antidiabetic treatment sometimes benefits the nervous symptoms.
We must also recognize disturbances of endocrine function caused by fear. The commo,nest of these is a definite hyperthyroidism. As in the case of diabetes, Graves' disease is known to be sometimiies caused by fear or otlier violent enlotion. and in my experience a minor degree of hyperthyroidistn, quite definitely perceptible, is very common in cases of so-called traunmatic neurasthenia and is one of Lhe causes which tend to keel) up that conidition.
Unfortunately it is a frequent habit among medical practitioners to label all such cases as " shock" without investigating or treating the physical concomitants of that condition. I ofteni come across the litigation neurosis, al.d from time to time I have trouble with it. I regret to say that it is occasionally fostered by members of our own profession.
Dr. W. A. BREND
said that the number of claims in court during recent years on account of traumatic neurasthenia alone was very small. This appeared to be due to two cat.ses: (1) the belief that it was in the interests of all parties to get these claims settled as early as possible, and (2) the uncertainty as to how the claim might be dealt with in court. He would instance a case in which the applicant had claimed for traumatic neurasthenia, but the medical witness for the defence had asserted, with an assurance which clearly impressed the Court, that the claimant had " locomotor ataxy." Counsel for the applicant accepted this assertion but claimed that the condition had been made worse by the accident. On examination by the medical referee, the applicant was found to show no signs of tabes dorsalis. The judge was perplexed because, as he pointed out to the wedical referee, he was bound by the evidence and therefore had to assume that the man had tabes. Eventually he asked the counsel if possible to arrive at an agreement without calling upon him to give a decision, and this they did.
As regards the question of a " lump sum," the Ministry of Pensions, soon after the war, made the experiment of giving to a number of selected patients suffering from war neuroses, substantial gratuities instead of pensions, but the result on the whole was disappointing. Many of the men failed to improve and were eventually relieved by appropriate psychotherapy. Traumatic neurasthenia in his (Dr. Brend's) opinion was a real thing if it was understood to mean a condition in which a severe shock was the final precipitating factor acting on a pre-existing psychopathic basis. In many of the civil cases in which the condition had apparently been produced by brooding over the accident, and was to be cured by giving a lump sum, he would prefer to call it, by another name than traumatic neurasthenia.
Dr. RISIEN RUSSELL said that there ought to be medical assessors to assist the judges in these cases, rather than that medical men should appear in the law courts on opposite sides. This discussion had shown how divergent the views of medical men, concerned with these cases, might be. If Sir Farquhar Buzzard meant that traumatic neurasthenia as opposed to "litigation neurosis" did not exist, he could not agree, as in his experience a clinical picture, identical in every respect, was met with, in which there was no question of expected compensation.
"Fear" or" shock " certainly was a contributory cause of the condition; but apart from fear at the time of the accident, there was in many of these cases another genuine fear-as to adequate compensation. The person injured in the hunting field could afford to be ill, but it was obviously another matter for a bread-winner of a family who sustained an injury-he must necessarily be anxious to be sufficiently compensated for the time during which he was unable to earn. Another element entered itito the manufacture of litigation eases, namely, the attitude of the medical man representing the company concerned with the compensation. He was sure that the attitude of incredulity was in no small degree responsible for much of the trouble, engendering fear that the sufferer was not going to be fairly dealt with, and arousing the antagonism of his family doctor. During a long period he (the speaker) rarely represented in court " the company concerned" but on many occasions he had appeared in support of the applicant. At the risk of appearing egotistical he must say he felt that this was largely due to his custom of approaching the person who had sustained the accident in a friendly spirit; by making it quite evident that he intended to be fair, he had been able to get the majority of such cases settled out of court.
Yet another important factor in these cases was the age of the person injured. In his own experience, people of advancing years, and notably those suffering from arterio-sclerosis, were liable to pass from the ordinary symptom complex of traumatic neurasthenia to that of cerebral degeneration. In such cases there was progressive deterioration, both physical and mental, in spite of all treatment calculated to prevent it.
Finally, he thought that consultations should be encouraged in such cases, to prevent them coming into the courts; failing this, the judges should be provided with medical assessors to assist them in forming a decision.
Sir WILLIAM WILLCOX (President of the Medico-Legal Society) said that in trials concerning cases of this kind he was in favour of leaving the decision to a judge and jury, since it was more likely that a common-sense verdict would thereby be reached, than if the decision were left to experts, either medical or legal.
He was of opinion that in such cases the best expert evidence should be called in and should receive the fullest consideration at the trial. All would agree that the expert should not be an advocate; his evidence should be absolutely fair and unbiased, and be directed towards the furtherance of justice and assistance to the court.
